

Manfred Kops

## Public Service Broadcasting - an Economic Definition

Paper Presented at the International Conference  
„Public Service Broadcasting:  
A German-Ukrainian Exchange of Opinions“

June 22, 2010,  
Kyiv-Mohyla School of Journalism,  
Kyiv, Ukraine

1. A Theoretical Model for the Description of Broadcasting Systems with the Market, the State, and the Civil Society (Voluntary Sector) as Basic Forms for the Provision of Broadcasting Programmes


2. Operationalising the Theoretical Model I: Revenue Structures as the Key Determinant for Broadcasting Systems

3. Revenue Structures as the Key Determinant for Broadcasting Systems: Empirical Results, Internationally Compared

4. Operationalising the Theoretical Model II: Legal Structures as the Key Determinant for Broadcasting Systems

5. Revenue Structures and Legal Structures as the Key Determinants for Broadcasting Systems: Empirical Results, Internationally Compared

6. Conclusions and Prospects



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
1.

A Theoretical Model for the Description of Broadcasting Systems with the Market, the State, and the Civil Society (Voluntary Sector) as Basic Forms for the Provision of Broadcasting Programmes

### 1.1. The Market and the State as Basic Forms for the Provision of Goods




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### 1.1. The Market and the State as Basic Forms for the Provision of Goods




- The State and the Market as the two Basic Forms for the Provision of Goods
- The State as Predominant Provider in Centrally Planned Economies

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


- The State and the Market as the two Basic Forms for the Provision of Goods
- The State as Predominant Provider in Centrally Planned Economies
- The Market as Predominant Provider in Market Economies, (the State as Subsidiary Provider)


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


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
Public Expenditure Ratio: State ./ GNP  
(here: PER = 50 %)

### 1.1. The Market and the State as Basic Forms for the Provision of Goods




Public Expenditure Ratios Vary Between Countries/Economies


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Public Expenditure Ratios

Land	Gesamtausgaben des Staates in v. H. des BIP						
	1990	1995	2000	2005	2006	2007	2008
Australien	35,2	38,2	35,2	34,8	34,5	33,8	33,7
Belgien	52,2	52,0	49,2	52,0	48,3	48,4	48,9
Dänemark	55,9	59,1	53,3	52,3	50,9	50,4	50,4
<b>Deutschland</b>	<b>44,5</b>	<b>54,8</b>	<b>45,1</b>	<b>46,9</b>	<b>45,3</b>	<b>43,8</b>	<b>43,4</b>
Finnland	48,3	61,4	48,4	50,5	48,8	47,3	47,3
Frankreich	49,3	54,4	51,6	53,5	52,7	52,4	52,5
Griechenland	50,2	45,8	46,7	43,1	42,0	43,5	43,2
Großbritannien	42,2	44,1	36,6	44,2	44,3	44,5	45,4
Irland	43,1	41,2	31,5	33,7	33,8	35,4	39,6
Island	41,5	42,7	41,9	42,2	41,7	42,8	43,9
Italien	53,5	52,5	46,1	48,2	48,8	48,2	48,4
Japan	31,9	36,5	39,0	38,4	36,0	35,8	36,4
Kanada	48,8	48,5	41,1	39,3	39,3	39,1	39,6
Luxemburg	37,7	39,8	37,9	41,5	38,7	37,9	39,2
Neuseeland	49,6	42,0	39,6	40,4	40,9	41,5	42,6
Niederlande	53,1	56,4	44,2	44,8	45,6	45,3	45,1
Norwegen	54,0	50,9	42,3	42,3	40,6	41,0	40,5
Österreich	51,5	56,5	52,1	49,9	49,4	48,4	48,4
Portugal	40,0	43,4	43,1	47,6	46,3	45,8	46,3
Schweden	61,3	65,3	57,0	54,0	53,1	51,4	51,2
Schweiz	30,0	35,0	35,1	35,3	33,7	32,9	32,6
Spanien	42,6	44,4	39,1	38,4	38,5	38,8	39,7
USA	37,1	37,0	34,2	36,6	36,5	37,4	38,6
<b>OECD Total</b>	<b>40,2</b>	<b>42,9</b>	<b>39,1</b>	<b>40,8</b>	<b>40,2</b>	<b>40,3</b>	<b>40,9</b>
<b>Eurozone</b>	<b>48,1</b>	<b>53,2</b>	<b>46,3</b>	<b>47,4</b>	<b>46,7</b>	<b>46,1</b>	<b>46,3</b>

Quelle: OECD, Economic Outlook 84, Paris 2008


Public Expenditure Ratios vary because of Differences in the (perceived) Capabilities of the State and the Market

### 1.1. The Market and the State as Basic Forms for the Provision of Goods

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Quelle: OECD, Economic Outlook 84, Paris 2008



### 1.2. The Civil Society as Basic Form for the Provision of Goods



## 1.2. The Civil Society as Basic Form for the Provision of Goods

Beside the Market and the State the Voluntary Sector (Civil Society) is a Third Basic Form for the Provision of Goods

Whereas the Provision by the Market is based on Extrinsic motives (Profit Making) and the Provision by the State is based on Legal Compulsion the Provision by the Voluntary Sector is based on Intrinsic Motives, e. g.


- Charity Motives to Help Poor and Disabled People,
- Artistic Motives to Create Works or,
- Publicistic and Journalistic Motives, e. g. to Express One's Opinion, to Tell „the Truth“ or to Convince Others.

The Value Creation of the Voluntary Sector is Large in all Economies, Although it is not Represented in the National Economic Product (GNP)


The Portion of the Voluntary Sector Compared to the Market Sector and the State Sector Differs between Economies, but the Differences Cannot be Derived from Official Statistics.




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
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
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
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
### 1.3. The Provision of Goods by the Market, the State, and the Civil Society




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
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
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
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
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### 1.3. The Provision of Goods by the Market, the State, and the Civil Society



1. Market, State and Civil Society
2. Revenue Structure as Determinant for Broadcasting Systems
3. Empirical Results. I
4. Legal Structure as Determinant for Broadcasting Systems
5. Empirical Results. II
6. Conclusions and Prospects

### 1.4. The Market, the State, and the Civil Society as Basic Forms for the Provision of Broadcasting Programmes

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### 1.4. The Market, the State, and the Civil Society as Basic Forms for the Provision of Broadcasting Programmes

Broadcasting Programmes (inclusive non-linear audiovisual services) also can be provided by the Market, the State, and the Voluntary Sector

The Market, the State, and the Voluntary Sector each have specific Strengths and Weaknesses

### 1.4. The Market, the State, and the Civil Society as Basic Forms for the Provision of Broadcasting Programmes

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
- Market** relies on self-interest, profit making
  - pro efficiency in the provision, individual decision freedom, preference oriented
  - con market failures (insufficient diversity and quality, external effects), negative distributional effects  
→ may jeopardize the equal freedom of opinion making for all citizens
- State** relies on sovereign compulsion, which in democracies is legally based on elections
  - pro non-market provision may correct or prevent market failures and negative distributional effects
  - con less efficient, less consumer oriented, less flexible and innovative than the market, no incentives to reduce costs, political content is biased ("state failures")  
→ may jeopardize the equal freedom of opinion making for all citizens
- Civil Soc** is neither driven by private profit making nor by the target to assure and obey political power; instead it relies on intrinsic motives
  - pro non-market provision may correct or prevent market failures and negative distributional effects
  - con non-market provision may correct or prevent state failures
  - con efficiency, consumer orientation, flexibility and innovativeness is lower than for market provision,
  - con voluntary funding is not abundant: no competitiveness with market and state broadcasters

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
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
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#### Four Types of Broadcasting Systems, Determined by the Number of Broadcasters and by the Broadcasters' (Pure or Mixed) Revenue Structure


Number of Broadcasters	Revenue Structure of the Broadcaster(s)	
	(all) pure	(all or some) mixed
one (monistic system)	(1) pure monistic system	(3) mixed monistic system
more than one (pluralistic system)	(2) pure pluralistic system	(4) mixed pluralistic system

### 1.4. The Market, the State, and the Civil Society as Basic Forms for the Provision of Broadcasting Programmes


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#### (1) pure monistic systems



(1.1) pure state system



(1.2) pure market system



(1.3) pure c.s. system




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
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#### (2) pure pluralistic systems



(2.1) state-market-system



(2.2) state-cs-system



(2.3) state-market-cs-system




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
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#### (3) mixed monistic systems



(3.1) state-influenced commercial broadcaster



(3.2) public service broadcaster



(3.3) equally mixed broadcaster




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
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#### (4) mixed pluralistic systems


(4.1) equally mixed pluralistic system




(4.2) public service pluralistic system



(4.3) equally mixed broadcaster




### 1.4. The Market, the State, and the Civil Society as Basic Forms for the Provision of Broadcasting Programmes



The Overall Sector Ratios are Weighted Averages for all Existing Separate Broadcasters of a Country

The USA as an Example


### 1.4. The Market, the State, and the Civil Society as Basic Forms for the Provision of Broadcasting Programmes



The Overall Sector Ratios are Weighted Averages for all Existing Separate Broadcasters of a Country

The German Dual Broadcasting Order as an Example


### 1.4. The Market, the State, and the Civil Society as Basic Forms for the Provision of Broadcasting Programmes



The Triangle Model as a Theoretical Scheme for the Description and Forecasting of National and International Changes of Broadcasting Orders

Worldwide Commercialisation as an Example


### 1.4. The Market, the State, and the Civil Society as Basic Forms for the Provision of Broadcasting Programmes



The Triangle Model as a Theoretical Scheme for Normative Requests for National and International Changes of Broadcasting Orders

Fine Tuning within the National Systems

### 1.4. The Market, the State, and the Civil Society as Basic Forms for the Provision of Broadcasting Programmes




The Triangle Model as a Theoretical Scheme for Normative Requests for National and International Changes of Broadcasting Orders

Disputes Within a Converging European Media System

### 2. Operationalising the Theoretical Model I:


### 2. Operationalising the Theoretical Model I: Revenue Structures as the Key Determinant for Broadcasting Systems

### Operationalising the Theoretical Model I: Revenue Structures as the Key Determinant for Broadcasting Systems







**Operationalising the Theoretical Model I:  
Revenue Structures as the Key Determinant for Broadcasting Systems**



**Operationalising the Theoretical Model I:  
Revenue Structures as the Key Determinant for Broadcasting Systems**



**Operationalising the Theoretical Model I:  
Revenue Structures as the Key Determinant for Broadcasting Systems**



Economists Approach: Regulate Broadcasters' Revenue Structures ...

... in Order to Steer Societal Effects of Broadcasting

**Operationalising the Theoretical Model I:  
Revenue Structures as the Key Determinant for Broadcasting Systems**

**Three (Pure) Types of Revenues**

- a) Market Revenues
- b) State Revenues
- c) Revenues from the Civil Society (Voluntary Sector)

**Operationalising the Theoretical Model I:  
Revenue Structures as the Key Determinant for Broadcasting Systems**

**Revenues from the Market:**

- Advertising and Sponsoring
- Subscriptions (Pay-per-View, Pay-per-Channel)
- Programme Sales
- Merchandising
- Other Transaction Revenues (e.g. from Telephone Call-Ins)

**Operationalising the Theoretical Model I:  
Revenue Structures as the Key Determinant for Broadcasting Systems**

**Revenues from the State:**

- Discretionary State Grants
- Discretionary Shares from Tax Revenues
- Rule-based State Grants
- Rule-based Shares from Tax Revenues
- Rule-based Devotion of a Public Revenue Source (e. g. of a Receiving Licence Fee)

**Operationalising the Theoretical Model I:  
Revenue Structures as the Key Determinant for Broadcasting Systems**

**Revenues from the Civil Society**

- Donations in Cash from Individuals
- Donations in Cash from NGOs
- Donations in Cash from Corporations
- Donations in Kind from Individuals (e. g. journalistic contributions)
- Donations in Kind from NGOs
- Donations in Kind from Corporations


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

The Revenue Structures of All Existing Broadcasters Contain both Market Revenues, and State Revenues and Civil Society Revenues

... however, the Shares of these Three Types of Revenues Vary

The Revenue Structures Can be Represented by Revenue Vectors, which are Based on the Triangle Model Explained Before



**Operationalising the Theoretical Model I:  
Revenue Structures as the Key Determinant for Broadcasting Systems**





**Operationalising the Theoretical Model I:  
Revenue Structures as the Key Determinant for Broadcasting Systems**

**USA as an Example**

Vector for the Average of all Broadcasters: 12, 12, 76



- 12 % Revenues from Civil Soc.
- 12 % Revenues from the State
- 76 % Revenues from the Market




**Operationalising the Theoretical Model I:  
Revenue Structures as the Key Determinant for Broadcasting Systems**

**Comparison USA - Germany**

- 12 % : 31 % Civil Society
- 12 % : 16 % State
- 76 % : 52 % Market




### Operationalising the Theoretical Model I: Revenue Structures as the Key Determinant for Broadcasting Systems




Civil Society: 0,00 Bill = CS  
 State: 0,00 Bill = St  
 Market: 1,23 Bill = Ma  
 License Fee: 6,86 Bill = ?

### Operationalising the Theoretical Model I: Revenue Structures as the Key Determinant for Broadcasting Systems

#### Revenues from the State differ in State Distance



### Operationalising the Theoretical Model I: Revenue Structures as the Key Determinant for Broadcasting Systems




Civil Society: 0,00 Bill. = CS  
 State: 0,00 Bill. = St  
 Market: 1,23 Bill. = Ma  
 Licence Fee: 6,86 Bill. = ?

2/3 of Licence Fee: 4,70 Bill. = CS  
 1/3 of Licence Fee: 2,16 Bill. = St

Civil Society: 4,70 Bill. = CS = 58 %  
 State: 2,16 Bill. = St = 27 %  
 Market: 1,23 Bill. = Ma = 15 %

### Operationalising the Theoretical Model I: Revenue Structures as the Key Determinant for Broadcasting Systems




Civil Society: 0,00 Bill. = Civ. S.  
 State: 0,00 Bill. = State  
 Market: 1,23 Bill. = Market  
 Licence Fee: 6,86 Bill. = ?

2/3 of Licence Fee: = Civ. S.  
 1/3 of Licence Fee: = State

\*\*\* Soft Criteria !!!!! \*\*\*



## Operationalising the Theoretical Model I: Revenue Structures as the Key Determinant for Broadcasting Systems



Civil Society: 0,00 Bill. = Civ. S.  
State: 0,00 Bill. = State  
Market: 1,23 Bill. = Market  
Licence Fee: 6,86 Bill. = ?

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\*\*\* Soft Criteria \*\*\*

Civil Society: 4,70 Bill. = Civ. S. = 58 %  
State: 2,16 Bill. = State = 27 %  
Market: 1,23 Bill. = Market = 15 %

1. Market, State and Civil Society
2. Revenue Structure as Determinant for Broadcasting Systems
3. Empirical Results I
4. Legal Structure as Determinant for Broadcasting Systems
5. Empirical Results II
6. Conclusions and Prospects

## 3. Revenue Structures as the Key Determinant for Broadcasting Systems: Empirical Results, Internationally Compared

1. Market, State and Civil Society
2. Revenue Structure as Determinant for Broadcasting Systems
3. Empirical Results I
4. Legal Structure as Determinant for Broadcasting Systems
5. Empirical Results II
6. Conclusions and Prospects

Country	Operating Income* Mio GBP	License fee %	Advert./ Spons. %	Govt Grants %	Other revenues %	Sum of revenues %
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Japan (NHK)	3.471	100	0	0	0	100
Norway (NRK)	235	99	1	0	0	100
Sweden (SVT)	310	98	1	1	0	100
Australia (ABC)	306	98	0	0	2	100
United Kingdom (BBC)	1.981	97	0	0	3	100
Denmark (DR)	436	91	1	0	8	100
Germany (ARD)***	3.806	82	9	0	9	100
Turkey (TRT)**	102	59	5	21	15	100
Belgium (VRT)****	227	77	22	0	1	100
Canada (CBC)	534	0	22	75	3	100
Germany (ZDF)****	951	73	17	0	10	100
Belgium (RTBF)****	122	72	20	0	8	100
Netherlands (NOS)	564	69	23	0	8	100
France (F3)*****	643	66	32	2	0	100
Czech Republic (CT)	80	61	24	0	15	100
Italy (RAI)	1.688	59	37	0	4	100
France (F2)*****	643	50	50	0	0	100
Portugal (RTP)	125	0	48	48	4	100
Poland (TVP)	286	32	37	0	31	100
Denmark (TV2)	436	25	72	0	3	100
Spain (RTVE)	467	0	64	25	11	100
South Africa (SABC)	246	18	78	0	4	100
New Zealand (TVNZ)	129	0	100	0	0	100
Germany (ARD+ZDF)	4.757	80	11	0	9	100
Belgium (VRT+RTBF)	349	75	21	0	3	100
France (F3+F2)	1.286	58	41	1	0	100

\* Operating income, excluding commercial income  
\*\* Public funding derives from: a 3.5% levy on electricity bills and a tax on electronic goods (59% and 21 % of operating income resp.)  
\*\*\* The total operating income for ARD and ZDF w as split by us by an estimated ratio of 80 % versus 20 %  
\*\*\*\* The total operating income for VRT and RTBF w as split by us by an estimated ratio of 65 % versus 35 %  
\*\*\*\*\* The total operating income for F2 and F3 w as split by us by an estimated ratio of 50 % versus 50 %

## Empirical Results, Internationally Compared

Source: McKINSEY 1999, p. 30,  
own calculations

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## Empirical Results, Internationally Compared

Our first quantitative approach  
for international comparisons:  
McKinsey-Study from 1999 for  
29 Public Service Broadcasters

Source: McKINSEY 1999, p. 30,  
own calculations

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### Empirical Results, Internationally Compared

Our first quantitative approach for international comparisons: McKinsey-Study from 1999 for 29 Public Service Broadcasters

4 types of revenues

Source: McKinSEY 1999, p. 30, own calculations

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### Empirical Results, Internationally Compared

Our first quantitative approach for international comparisons: McKinsey-Study from 1999 for 29 Public Service Broadcasters

4 types of revenues:

- License fee
- Advertising/Sponsoring
- Government/State Grants
- Other Revenues

Source: McKinSEY 1999, p. 30, own calculations

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### Empirical Results, Internationally Compared

Our first quantitative approach for international comparisons: McKinsey-Study from 1999 for 29 Public Service Broadcasters

4 types of revenues

Simple reallocation of revenues from the licence fee:  
 50 % as state revenues,  
 50 % as civil society revenues.

Source: McKinSEY 1999, p. 30, own calculations

Country	Operating Income*	tot. Rev. vol sect	tot. Rev. state sect	tot. Rev. com sect	tot. Rev. vol %	tot. Rev. state %	tot. Rev. com %
(1)	(2)	(8a)	(8b)	(8c)	(9a)	(9b)	(9c)
Japan (NHK)	3.471	1.736	1.736	0	50,0%	50,0%	0,0%
Norway (NRK)	235	116	116	2	49,5%	49,5%	1,0%
Sweden (SVT)	310	152	155	3	49,0%	50,0%	1,0%
Australia (ABC)	306	152	152	2	49,7%	49,7%	0,7%
United Kingdom (BBC)	1.981	981	981	20	49,5%	49,5%	1,0%
Denmark (DR)	436	210	210	16	48,2%	48,2%	3,7%
Germany (ARD)***	3.806	1.674	1.674	457	44,0%	44,0%	12,0%
Turkey (TRT)**	102	35	57	10	34,5%	55,5%	10,0%
Belgium (VRT)****	227	88	88	51	38,8%	38,8%	22,3%
Canada (CBC)	534	5	406	123	1,0%	76,0%	23,0%
Germany (ZDF)***	951	379	379	193	39,8%	39,8%	20,3%
Belgium (RTBF)****	122	47	47	28	38,7%	38,7%	22,7%
Netherlands (NOS)	564	210	210	145	37,2%	37,2%	25,7%
France (F3)*****	643	212	225	206	33,0%	35,0%	32,0%
Czech Republic (CT)	80	28	28	23	35,5%	35,5%	29,0%
Italy (RAI)	1.688	520	520	647	30,8%	30,8%	38,3%
France (F2)*****	643	161	161	322	25,0%	25,0%	50,0%
Portugal (RTP)	125	2	62	62	1,3%	49,3%	49,3%
Poland (TVP)	286	75	75	135	26,3%	26,3%	47,3%
Denmark (TV2)	436	59	59	318	13,5%	13,5%	73,0%
Spain (RTVE)	467	17	134	316	3,7%	28,7%	67,7%
South Africa (SABC)	246	25	25	195	10,3%	10,3%	79,3%
New Zealand (TVNZ)	129	0	0	129	0,0%	0,0%	100,0%
Germany (ARD+ZDF)	4.757	2.053	2.053	650	43,2%	43,2%	13,7%
Belgium (VRT+RTBF)	349	135	135	78	38,8%	38,8%	22,4%
France (F3+F2)	1.286	373	386	527	29,0%	30,0%	41,0%

### Empirical Results, Internationally Compared


First quantitative approach for international comparisons: McKinsey-Study from 1999 for 29 Public Service Broadcasters

Result:

roughly adjusted revenue vectors


Source: McKinSEY 1999, p. 30, own calculations

**Empirical Results,  
Internationally Compared**



Based on the Data from McKinsey 1999 for PSB There is a Large Variation, with some Broadcasters that do not Deserve the Label PSB

**Empirical Results,  
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


Based on the Data from McKinsey 1999 for PSB There is a Large Variation, with some Broadcasters that do not Deserve the Label PSB.


If the original data are Corrected for the differences In State Influence, some would shift upwards (towards Civil Society), others would shift downwards (towards the State).

**4. Operationalising the Theoretical Model II:  
Legal Structures as the Key Determinant for Broadcasting Systems**

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


4. Operationalising the Theoretical Model II:  
Legal Structures as the Key Determinant for Broadcasting Systems



5. Revenue Structures and Legal Structures as the Key Determinants for Broadcasting Systems: Empirical Results, Internationally Compared

Revenue Structures and Legal Structures as the Key Determinants for Broadcasting Systems: Empirical Results, Internationally Compared



6. Conclusions and Prospects



## Conclusions and Prospects

- 1. The Comparison of Broadcasting Systems becomes more important in the course of international conversion, especially in the course of European harmonisation**
- 2. There is no standard instrument for the comparison of Broadcasting Systems**
- 3. Both economic and legal criteria need to be considered**
- 4. A comparison of Broadcasting Systems requires a consensus about the set of determinants and about the determinants relative importance (weights)**
- 5. Different academic disciplines need to provide its knowledge.**

1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.
Market, State and Civil Society	Revenue Structure as Determinant for Broadcasting Systems	Empirical Results. I	Legal Structure as Determinant for Broadcasting Systems	Empirical Results II	Conclusions and Prospects

